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Sher on blame 
 
In this paper I consider the argument propounded by George Sher in his book In Praise of Blamei to the 
conclusion that blame is an essential constituent of morality, that the latter would be inconceivable 
without it. 
Sher maintains that the concept of blame has two distinct components: a belief that someone has 
behaved badly or has a bad character plus something else. It is specifying the nature of the ‘something 
else’ which creates most of the difficulty, and much of Sher’s book is devoted to grappling with this 
problem. 
Before providing his own analysis of blame, Sher presents three existing alternative views and 
finds fault with all of them. The first is a proposal ‘favored by some utilitarians . . . that what we are 
doing when we blame someone is expressing our disapproval of his behavior or character in a way that 
we hope will change it’ (Sher 2006, 13; see also 71-4). He rejects this theory on the grounds that blame 
does not always have to be overtly expressed, but can be just a private thought (Sher 2006, 74). The 
second theory, of which Michael Zimmerman is an exponent (1988, 38-9), is that ‘what blaming 
someone adds to believing that he has acted badly or is a bad person is some sort of further belief—for 
example, that his misbehavior has somehow stained his “moral record” or reduced his “moral balance”’ 
(Sher 2006, 13; see also 75-8). This view is rejected on the grounds that its advocates cannot explain 
why we should take any interest in people’s ‘moral balance’ over and above our interest in the fact that 
they have acted badly (Sher 2006, 78). The final theory considered by Sher is that to blame someone is 
to react to her with some negative emotion such as anger or hostility.ii He rejects this view on the 
grounds that its defenders cannot give a credible explanation of why some people are worthy of blame. 
Acting badly or having a bad character cannot be enough in itself—we are not entitled to be angry with 
just anyone of whom this is true (Sher 2006, 87). 
The theory of blame subsequently offered by Sher himself to replace these inadequate views (and I 
agree that they are inadequate) is that to blame someone is to believe that she has done something 
wrong or that she has a bad character plus also to have the desire or wish that she not have done this 
wrong thing or that she not have this bad character (Sher 2006, 14; see also 93-114). This account has 
such merits as the fact that it evidently allows blame to be a purely private matter (for the desire 
referred to need not be expressed), and the fact that it explains why when one blames another one has 
certain dispositions, namely: to feel anger or hostility to that person, to reproach or reprimand her, or 
(when the person blamed is oneself) to apologize for what one has done. (But notice that unlike in the 
third of the existing theories considered by Sher, blame is not identified with such dispositions.) 
Sher moves on from the presentation and defense of this analysis to consider the question of why 
those who act badly or have a bad character might be considered worthy of blame (Sher 2006, 115-
138). His answer is that this follows from the very nature of morality, more specifically from certain 
formal features which, it is agreed by almost everyone, moral principles must possess. They must be 
practical (primarily for guiding action), universal (applying to everyone), omnitemporal (applying at 
all times), overriding (having priority over virtually every other consideration) and inescapable (such 
that no-one can opt out of their requirements). The practicality of moral principles entails that if one 
accepts a moral principle one must have at least some desire to do what it says. Their universality and 
omnitemporality respectively entail that this desire must apply to others besides oneself, and must 
extend beyond the present to the past and future. Finally, their overridingness and inescapability 
together entail that this desire must have the sort of strength that would be needed to give rise to a 
disposition to feel anger and hostility. 
As well as showing why it is appropriate to blame those who have done wrong or who have a bad 
character, Sher also thinks that this theory explains why such people deserve blame, since, he argues, to 
make such a desert claim is just to state that such blame would be appropriate (Sher 2006, 131). 
I turn now to the evaluation of Sher’s theory.iii I accept that if his analysis of blame is correct, this 
entails that morality generally renders blame appropriate for wrongdoers, and roughly for the reasons 
explained by Sher. However, I want to establish the following: 
 
(i) Sher has not in fact succeeded in explaining why blame, understood in terms of his analysis, can 
be deserved. 
(ii) Sher’s analysis of blame is in any case incomplete in a way that casts additional doubt on the 
claim that wrongdoers generally deserve blame. 
 
First, to explain why, even if we accept Sher’s analysis of blame, we should reject his account of 
why people deserve blame, understood in his sense. The reason for this has to do with a certain 
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conceptual point about desert, namely, that whenever a person negatively deserves something, what she 
deserves (in the strictest moral sense) must be something that she experiences as bad or unpleasant. It is 
clear that Sher is working with a rather more anemic version of desert, whereby to say that someone 
deserves something (positive or negative) means little more than that it would be appropriate for her to 
receive it. But as a matter of conceptual necessity, this is not enough for desert. It also needs the fact 
that the deserving person would experience what she deserves as pleasant (in the case of positive 
desert) or as unpleasant (in the case of negative desert). Nothing in Sher’s analysis of blame explains 
why a person for whom blame was, according to that analysis, appropriate ought to be treated in a way 
that she would find unpleasant. For being the subject of a belief that one has acted badly plus a desire 
that one not have acted in this way is not an intrinsically unpleasant thing. True, Sher’s account does 
readily explain why someone might deserve blame in his sense of the word. For it is indeed the case 
that if someone has done something bad, thus flouting or ignoring some requirement of morality, it 
would be appropriate both to believe that this is the case and to wish that she had not done it. But that 
fact is not sufficient to establish that she deserves blame in the full sense of (negative) desert, requiring 
treatment that she would find unpleasant.  
Now to establish my second point, which is that Sher’s analysis of blame is incomplete. To make 
the point with sufficient care, I need to distinguish between what I shall call third person and second 
person blame. Third person blame is expressed when A says sincerely that she blames B for something, 
but has no particular intention that B know this. In contrast, second person blame is expressed when A 
says that she blames B with precisely this intention. It is expressed by using ‘I blame you for . . .’ and 
similar phrases.iv There is also of course first person blame, in which one blames oneself, and which 
usually takes the form of guilt feelings. 
Second person blame appears essential to our overall concept of blame, and so any satisfactory 
analysis of blame must deal successfully with it. Now, in this connection, it is important to note that to 
express second person blame to someone is not merely to report one’s own attitudes to her or to what 
she has done. If you sincerely say to someone ‘I blame you for X,’ then you will necessarily be doing 
something that she is likely to find unwelcome. Those who are learning the use of the word in its 
second person occurrence have to realize this, on pain of not fully grasping what is involved in this 
speech-act. Notice that this characterization does not require a blamer to intend that the blamee be 
distressed. That need not be my aim in blaming you for something, but, in doing so, I must believe that 
there is some likelihoodv that you will find it unwelcome. 
We need not concern ourselves with the psychological or sociological origins of the speech-act of 
expressing second person blame. No doubt they have something to do with the survival value of a 
certain kind of social control. The important point for us here is that second person blame exists and 
seems to form an essential part of our entire notion of blaming. In particular, an understanding of 
second person blame seems essential to a correct account of third person blame. For if A blames B in 
the third person sense for doing X, then this seems to mean—at a minimum—that A believes that B did 
X in such a way as to satisfy standard criteria for moral responsibility and that because of this, 
according to conventional moral precepts, one would be justified in expressing second person blame to 
B. Again, first person blame can be regarded as equivalent to either third or second person blame, with 
the special feature that the person blamed is identical to the person who is blaming. In other words, one 
expresses first person blame either by saying to another that one blames oneself (third person) or 
(perhaps less often) by saying to oneself something along the lines of ‘I blame you’ (second person). 
So blame is a more complex matter than even Sher’s sophisticated analysis allows for—and in a 
way that brings into question his belief (which he is far from alone in holding) that wrongdoers 
generally deserve blame. Given the stronger conception of blame that I have advocated here, as 
opposed to Sher’s weaker concept, it still needs explaining why this would be the case—in particular 
why wrongdoers would ever deserve to be the recipients of second person blame, i.e., to be addressed 
in a way that they would be likely to find unwelcome. 
The defect that I have identified in Sher’s analysis of blame is no trivial matter, particularly given 
one of the major aims announced in his book, which is to try to establish that some people deserve 
blame without having to address the complex issue of determinism and its implications for moral 
responsibility. If I am right, Sher only manages to avoid getting stuck in this quagmire by missing out 
the very element in the nature of blame that makes moral responsibility and determinism relevant—its 
necessary connection with the idea of wrongdoers’ being treated in ways that they find unwelcome. (If 
determinism is true, how can anyone ever deserve to have an unwelcome feeling?) Bring that element 
back in—as, I have argued, we are conceptually obliged to do—and determinism is seen to be as 
threatening as ever to our established practices of blame and of holding people morally responsible for 
their actions. 
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I want to end with a clarification. Up to now, the impression may have been created that Sher and I 
are very far apart on the question of blame. However, at least where practical ethics is concerned, the 
difference is not as great as it appears. The reason for this is as follows. Sher maintains, as we have 
seen, that a logically necessary condition for blame is the presence of a belief that someone has acted 
badly or has a bad character plus a desire that she not have acted thus or not have such a character. 
Such a belief-desire pair tends to give rise to certain dispositions such as anger or hostility. But Sher is 
undecided about whether these dispositions are themselves also logically necessary for blame. My own 
view, which I defended above, is that the belief-desire pair is not sufficient. But in any case, Sher 
recognizes the possibility of a kind of ‘stripped down’ blame, which requires only the belief-desire pair, 
not the dispositions normally associated with them. He then briefly addresses the question of whether it 
would be possible for human beings to make do with just this stripped down version. He is not sure of 
the answer to this question, but suggests that ‘it may be possible to improve the quality of our social 
relations by lowering the condemnatory volume and compensating for any resulting diminution of 
social control in other ways’ (Sher 2006, 138). I thoroughly agree. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
i
 George Sher,  In Praise of Blame. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
ii
 Sher 2006, 13; see also 78-91. P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and other essays 
(London: Methuen, 1974), 1-25 is mentioned as one of the main sources for this view. 
 
iii
 I focus entirely on blame for bad acts, ignoring bad characters. This is because I do not want to 
get embroiled here in the discussion of whether it is ever right to blame a person for her bad character. 
(Of course, whether or not it is ever right, I would maintain that it is never deserved.) 
 
iv
 There are in fact a great variety of ways of expressing second person blame. They do not all use 
the word ‘blame’ or any synonym of it.  If my wife says to me ‘You didn’t do the washing up’ in a 
certain tone of voice, this can be an expression of second person blame. 
 
v
 By this I mean a likelihood all other things being equal. In some cases I might know that the 
blamee is particularly thick-skinned and will feel no distress. 
 
